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Capture of Beaumont Hamel : ウィキペディア英語版
Capture of Beaumont Hamel

Beaumont-Hamel is situated near the northern end of the forty five kilometre front to be assaulted by the French and British. The attack, originally scheduled for June 29, 1916, following a hitherto unprecedented five-day artillery bombardment, was postponed by two days to July 1, 1916, partly on account of inclement weather, partly to allow more time for the artillery preparation.
At Beaumont-Hamel, the 29th Division , with its three Infantry Brigades, the 86th, the 87th and the 88th, faced particularly formidable defences, resolutely manned by the experienced troops of the 119th (Reserve) Infantry Regiment (a part of the Wurttemberg 26th (Reserve Division), who had been manning this part of the line for nearly 20 months. It was nevertheless confidently expected that the artillery bombardment would have extensively degraded both the German defences and morale. In reality, although considerable damage was done to the trenches, in many places the barbed wire remained relatively intact. More particularly the defenders, protected within deep dugouts, were largely unscathed.
The plan at Beaumont-Hamel required the four initial assaulting battalions from the 86th and 87th Brigades to move up to the German wire by 7:30 a.m. - the designated Zero hour. In conjunction with the infantry moving forward, the heavy and medium artillery bombardment onto the German first line was scheduled to lift onto other targets, retaining only shrapnel and mortar fire on the enemy forward positions. Simultaneously, as the leading infantry left their trenches to arrive at the German wire prior to their assault, a powerful mine with 18,500 kg. of explosives, was fired at 7:20 a.m. under a German strong point on the Hawthorn Ridge (to the immediate north of Y Ravine). The intention was to destroy a major enemy strong point, to seize the crater rim and dominate the enemy trenches. However, the German reaction was so swift that the troops of the 2nd R Fusiliers of the 86th Brigade, detailed to take the crater, found themselves fighting for survival and unable to provide the intended support.
Catastrophically, the firing of the mine forewarned the Germans that the attack was probably imminent, and the troops of the 119th (Reserve) Infantry Regiment deployed from their dugouts into the firing line, scarcely hampered by the field artillery shrapnel barrage. The battalions, moving up for the assault and still only part of the way across No Man's Land, were subjected to well directed small arms fires from riflemen and machine guns. Concurrently the German artillery, which was relatively unscathed by the British counter battery fire, directed an intense barrage on the advancing troops and the British lines and communications. This added to the devastation in No Man's Land, caught the following battalions, wrought havoc in the trenches and almost paralysed movement through the communication trenches. For the battalions caught in No Man's Land as they moved forward to their intended assault positions, the situation was compounded at 7:30 a.m. when the shrapnel barrage lifted 100 yards (90 m.) off the German forward line, and continued lifting 100 yards every two minutes toward the German second and third lines. Excepting the right flank, where elements of the 1st Inniskillings did break into and through the German 1st to 3rd line, the initial assault foundered at, or short of, the German wire.
The plan called for the second wave of the attack (the remaining two battalions from each leading Brigade) to leave the British forward line at 7:30 a.m. as the assaulting battalions reached the German wire. On the left flank those of the 86th Brigade were delayed by the German counter barrage "and it was not until 7:55 a.m. that they advanced." On the right flank, taking in the area now occupied by the Memorial site and some of the Mary Redan to the immediate south, in the words of the 87th Brigade War Diary "The 1st KOSB and 1st Border Regiment left their assembly trenches at about 7:35 a.m. and advancing under very heavy machine gun fire failed to get as far as the leading battalions with the exception of the leading sections of the 1st Border Regiment which got as far as the German wire."
==The Newfoundland Advance==
At Divisional Headquarters the commander (Major General Beauvoir de Lisle) and his staff were trying to unravel numerous and confusing messages coming back from observation posts, contact aircraft and the two leading brigades. The indications were that some troops had broken into and gone beyond the German first line. He therefore ordered the 88th Brigade, which was in reserve, to send forward two battalions to support the right attack. At 8:45 a.m. the 1st Newfoundland and 1st Essex received orders to move forward independently, occupy the enemy's first trench and clear forward to Station Road (behind the enemy 3rd line).
The original plan for the Newfoundlanders (and 1st Essex) was to move forward about 10:00 a.m. through the troops of the initial assault Brigades and take the third objective " the enemy's third line trenches on the GRANDCOURT RIDGE." But now, in the words of the Newfoundlanders' War Diary, they received the following instructions: - "0845 - Received orders on the telephone to move forward in conjunction with 1st Essex Regt and occupy the enemy's first trench—our objective being from point 89 to just north of point 60 and work forward to Station Road clearing the enemy trenches—and move as soon as possible. Asked Brigade if enemy's 1st trench has been taken and received reply to the effect that the situation was not cleared up. Asked Brigade if we were to move off to the attack independently of Essex Regt and received reply in the affirmative."
The Newfoundlanders were situated in St. John's Road, a support trench, 200 metres behind the British forward line and out of sight of the enemy. Because the communication trenches were congested with dead and wounded and under shell fire, the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hadow, decided to move immediately into attack formation and advance across the surface. The Essex Regiment, on their right flank, were visible to German positions at Thiepval and were therefore compelled to move up through the congested trenches; they did not get into position until 10:50 a.m. The Newfoundlanders were on their own, supported only by some mortar and machine gun fire.
The Newfoundlanders started their advance at 9:15 a.m., moving in their pre-rehearsed formation with A and B Companies leading in lines of platoons in file or single file at 40 pace intervals and 25 paces between sections, followed at 100 yard distance by C and D Companies in similar formation. As they breasted the skyline behind the British first line, they were effectively the only troops moving on the battlefield and were subjected to the full wrath of the 119th (Reserve) Infantry Regiment manning the positions ahead and the German artillery.
A great many fell before they even crossed the British line. Many more were hit as they picked their way through the gaps in the British wire. With exemplary courage, the survivors picked up their assault formations as best they could and "with chins tucked down as if walking into a blizzard" continued toward the German line about 400 metres further on. Halfway down the slope an isolated tree marked an area where the enemy's fire was particularly concentrated. Called "The Danger Tree," a representation of its twisted skeleton now stands at the spot where so many fell on that tragic July day.
At 9:45 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Hadow, who had witnessed the destruction of much of his Battalion from his Headquarters in Sap 4, reported to the Brigade Commander (based in a nearby dugout) that the advance had failed. Within 15 to 20 minutes of leaving St. John's Road trench approximately 85% of those who had started forward were dead, dying or wounded. Only one other battalion (the 10th West Yorks at Fricourt) suffered more heavily on July 1, 1916. For many men, however, it was far from over. Isolated survivors continued to engage the Germans from No Man's Land and about 40 men, taken under command of a Captain G.E. Malcolm of 1st KOSB, attempted to continue the attack but were finally stopped just short of the enemy line. Of this Captain Malcolm, who was wounded, later reported, "I should like to congratulate the Newfoundland Regiment on their extreme steadiness under trying conditions."
The tragedy had yet to play out in full for the 1st Essex. By the time they were in position the Divisional Commander had ordered a cessation of all attacks. However, due to numerous communication difficulties, the message did not reach them. The two lead companies attempted to advance and suffered about 250 casualties before their Commanding Officer called a halt.
Few of the wounded lying in No Man's Land could attempt to retire to safety before nightfall, and many either died where they lay, or were subsequently killed by artillery fire or watchful enemy riflemen and machine gunners 1. Several wounded were not recovered until four nights later. Meantime, the remnants of the Battalion, along with the reserve that had been held back, continued to hold a part of the line against expected German counter attacks until relieved on July 6, incurring further casualties in the process, including at least four officers on the afternoon of July 1. When they left the line on July 6 to billets in Engelbelmer the Battalion's fighting strength numbered 168 other ranks. Here, on July 7, Lieutenant O.W. Steele was wounded by shellfire and died the following day.
The Newfoundlanders manned the line again from July 14 to 17, by then up to a strength of eleven officers and 260 riflemen. On July 27, with the rest of the Division , they entrained for billets at Candas, by which stage Battalion strength was up to 554.
1 The situation of men lying in No Man's Land was aggravated by a shiny tin triangle each wore on his back. These were to enable identification by the liaison aircraft and artillery observers, but for men lying wounded, or in such cover as they could find, they also signalled any movement to the enemy.

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
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